There is a tradeoff between safety and cost, the latter measured
both in dollars and foregone opportunities.
The more safety, the higher the dollar cost and the more valuable the
foregone opportunities. Moreover, there
is no way of achieving complete safety.
Balancing safety, cost, and the value of foregone opportunities
can be thought of as an optimization problem (not that we know the
optimum). The more constraints added in
the form of Government Safety Regulations (GSR) that reflect a focus on only part of the problem, the less
likely the optimum is a feasible solution.
The problem with GSRs is that
tradeoffs seldom are taken into proper account.
GSRs too often reflect a focus on reducing the probability of obvious
adverse events without considering adequately their less obvious adverse consequences. There is a reason for this – most voters,
media talking heads, and politicians are aware of the former and unaware or
less aware of the latter. Therefore,
they clamor for GSRs protecting them from the former – and Government obliges. The result is a high probability that GSRs
are too restrictive – in the sense that an informed populace would choose less
restrictive GSRs. A reasonable assumption
is that GSRs are too restrictive and often cost lives by failing to consider
all aspects of safety.
Example: Drugs
Drug safety is paramount in most people’s minds. The last thing Politicians and Bureaucrats
want is an angry public reaction to a drug killing people. Consequently, GSRs focus on assuring safety. But the only way safety can be assured is by
not using drugs. GSRs try to accomplish safety
by requiring a huge amount of expensive and time-consuming testing and
approving only “safe” drugs. This
assures a large measure of safety, but at the cost of unnecessarily expensive
drugs that reach the market long after they could have, the failure to develop
drugs with possible serious side-effects for diseases where no effective drugs
currently exist, and the failure to develop drugs that would have been
effective for serious rare diseases where the potential market cannot justify the
expense of going through the approval process.
Safety is necessarily achieved at the cost of excess deaths – a tradeoff
that is largely ignored in the analysis leading to the GSRs.
The potential excess deaths can be large. To illustrate, suppose a drug is delayed one
year and that it can reduce the death rate from a serious disease by 50% from
20% to 10% relative to existing drugs.
If the disease’s incidence in the population is 0.01%, then about 30,000
people in the US will contract it annually. Of
these, 6,000 people will die if the new drug is not available and 3,000 will
die if it is available. Excess deaths
are 3,000 for each year delayed. But
this is only part of the story, because subsequent even newer drugs each will
be delayed, too. Thus, the total of
excess deaths over time far exceeds 3,000 with a drug approval process that
takes one year longer than the optimum.
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